AT409 Week 8 Report

 

Week 8

Introduction

            The week of October 11^th through the 17^th involved working with crew 4 surprisingly often. On October 13^th, both crews were assigned to aid in Weldon’s search and rescue missions at the Purdue Wildlife Area (PWA). Additionally, there was a miscommunication between crews on October 16^th regarding who was flying the Martell flight for that day. The issue was quickly resolved, ending with crew 1 (John and Jeff) flying the Martell mission that day while crew 4 opted to study Bramor procedures in the lab.

October 13^th – PWA Search and Rescue

            At 9:30 on October 13^th, crews one and four met with William Weldon and Ethan Hoke at PWA to begin the search and rescue missions of the day. Weldon made a series of changes to the standard operations of these missions including reducing the number of data analysts to only one person utilizing Loc8. Additionally, a map of the flight area was designed with a grid overlay. These maps were provided to the data analysts so they could dispatch the recovery team(s) more effectively, directing them to specific grid locations rather than offering vague directions toward the target. Jeff Hines took the role as primary data handler and operator of the Loc8 program. Logan Jones acted as PIC for the Mavic 2 flights. Other members present acted as visual observers whenever the Mavic 2 was airborne and recovery teams during data processing. The full breakdown of roles can be seen in Table 1 below.

Mission Conductor	William Weldon
Data Handler & Loc8 Operator	Jeff Hines
Mavic 2 PIC	Logan Jones
Visual Observer & Recovery Team Member	John Cox, Conner Cromwell, Kalbe Gould, Joe Hammel, Ethan Hoke,

Table 1

PWA responsibilities on October 13^th, 2020

            Operations began immediately with Weldon hiding the target upon initial setup while the other crews continued setting up their respective areas – the Loc8 program and the Mavic 2. The first flight took off at 9:51 and completed its mission with no issues at 10:02. All important times related with the day’s flights can be found in Table 2 – any bolded entries imply that was the dispatch that recovered the target. The Loc8 operator had trouble identifying the exact location of the target, so he sent out two teams to search areas he though the target might be at 10:08. Despite the increased numbers, both recovery teams returned nearly 10 minutes after with negative results. The maps were referenced for the first dispatch, but it seems there was some confusion between the data analyst and the recovery teams in reading these maps. After both parties gathered, discussed the map and the location that the target was spotted, the teams were sent out again at 10:21 and the target was recovered at 10:33. To the credit of both parties, the maps were created such that the fields were not divided evenly which lead to confusion. Diagram 1 depicts a map with similar characteristics to the ones provided to the crews present that day. Those present and using the maps suggested a revised map, one with more standard spacing for the location.

 

Diagram 1

Representation of the maps provided to the crews on October 13^th, 2020

The second flight went according to the books, with quick flight and data analysis turnaround times as well as a first attempt recovery of the target. However, at the start of the third flight there were some concerns about the steadily increasing wind speed. After some discussion with the PIC and consulting the KLAF METAR, we determined it was safe to conduct a third flight and we would check the updated METAR before conducting a fourth flight. Once again, the flight and data processing side of the mission went according to the books, but there was an error when sending out the first recovery team. The Loc8 operator sent the first team out to the wrong location due to a desire to get boots on the ground as soon as possible. After

a few more minutes of analyzing photos, he realized his mistake and sent out another team to the appropriate location. The target was found quickly after.

            Upon completion of the third flight, the team waited 10 minutes for the KLAF METAR to update, in order to get a more accurate wind speed. Once the METAR updated, the PIC determined the wind was too volatile to continue safe operations and cancelled any further PWA flights. The crews packed up the equipment for the day and returned to COMP 101. After ensuring there were no further tasks that Weldon needed or wanted done, crew 1 completed their search and rescue missions for the day around 12:30.

	Takeoff Time	Landing Time	Search Begins	Discovery	Dispatch	Second Dispatch	Recovery
Flight 1	9:51	10:02	10:04	10:07	10:08	10:21	10:33
Flight 2	10:43	10:55	10:56	11:01	11:02	N/A	11:07
Flight 3	11:16	11:28	11:29	11:36	11:39	11:42	11:49

Table 2

Important time markers for each flight at PWA on October 13^th, 2020

 

October 16^th – Martell M600 Flight 

            When our flight crew assembled at the lab to prepare for the days flight, we encountered a scheduling issue - flight crews 1 and 4 had scheduled a flight at the same time. After a brief discussion, the crews realized that the communication error was due to a nuance in using the google calendar system. If someone creates an event in the calendar, everyone in the group can see the event but only those assigned to the event will receive a notification. After resolving that issue, another mistake was made; while packing for the flight, the PPK case was not opened and checked before it was loaded. This lead to the flight crew going out to the mission area without realizing they had left the PPK batteries on the charger back at the lab. Upon realizing this, the PIC the return to retrieve them while the SO stayed on site with the aircraft and equipment. Once the above issues had been addressed, at 10:23am John Cox and Jeff Hines began another set of flights over the Martel forest northwest and northeast plots.

Having learned from last week that Jeff’s car was too small to fit the M600 case they tried John’s car; his was also too small for the entire M600 case. The team was able to transport the M600 partially assembled in John’s car without its case much like last week.

Once the aircraft was assembled John acted as PIC for the mission and Jeff the FO/VO to encourage flight safety. The team was under a bit of a time crunch, as John had a class to attend at 11:30, so they decided to remain in familiar roles for this set of missions for the sake of time. The missions went smoothly with no further issues. The relevant metadata and important times for the two flights are recorded in the Table 3 below. Upon completion of the flights, the aircraft was partially disassembled in order to fit it into the vehicle. The data gathered from the flight was post processed according to standard procedure by Jeff. In the meantime, John disassembled and stored the aircraft in the COMP 101 lab, ensuring all batteries and controllers were placed on their charging ports to be used by the next flight crew. 

	Aircraft	Sensor(s)	Batteries	Takeoff Time	Landing Time
Flight 1 - Martell Northwest	M600	Sony A6000 & Zenmuse XT2	Yellow	10:23	10:44
Flight 2 - Martell Northeast	M600	Sony A6000 & Zenmuse XT2	Pink	10:51	11:16

Table 3

Abridged metadata for the flights on October 16^th, 2020

Upon concluding the days operations, flight crew 1 gathered to discuss the issues in the mission's preparation. Jeff and John identified 3 main problems that needed to be addressed: 

1.)  2 flight crews being assigned to the same aircraft at the same time due to miscommunication 

2.)  Not checking the PPK case before packing it

3.)  Not checking to make sure the PPK batteries were in their appropriate case prior to departing the lab  

The flight crew determined that the miscommunication was mainly due to the inexperience of various members of the class with Microsoft Teams. As corrective action, it has been suggested that every flight crew have their flights scheduled at least 1 week in advance and check the calendar on the Sunday of each week. The PPK case incident and the batteries was determined to follow this chain of events: Flight crew 1 was delayed by the miscommunication with flight crew 4, this caused the flight crew to rush to get the aircraft loaded. The SO, Jeff, did not check the PPK case prior to loading it in the vehicle. The PIC, John, did not ask and then verify with the SO that the PPK case and its batteries were ready. It is in flight crew 1’s own opinion that the rush to get into the mission area, a degree of complacency, and a failure to follow the proper checklist and procedures led to our failure to bring the PPK batteries to the field. Corrective measures to be taken by the flight crew will be a much stricter adherence to the checklists. It is recommended among our members that the PIC of the mission give a mission brief to the rest of the flight crew before the vehicle is packed, this briefing should include: The mission location, aircraft and sensor to be used, the roles of the individual flight crew members, and a verbal reading of the aircraft packing and preflight checklist.